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It more than 10 years since the addition of uncom-
mercial transactions to the table of deemed “debts
incurred” in s 588G(1A) of the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) (the Act). What, if anything, has this sub-section
achieved? One could be forgiven for answering: “not a
great deal”. What follows is a possible explanation of
why this has been so, and what needs to be done to
enable this aspect of Australia’s insolvent trading laws to
operate effectively and as originally intended.
The Corporations Law Amendment (Employee Entitle-
ments) Act 2000 (Cth) amended s 588G(1A) in order to
“deem that a company incurs a debt for the purposes of
the insolvent trading provisions when it enters into an
uncommercial transaction, thereby extending the current
duty on directors not to engage in insolvent trading.”1
The 2000 amendment added uncommercial transac-
tions as a seventh item to a table of deemed incurred
debts in s 588G(1A). This table of debts incurred for the
purposes of s 588G also includes payments of dividends
(item 1), reduction of share capital (item 2) share
buy-backs (item 3), redemption and issue of redeemable
preference shares (items 4 and 5) and financial assis-
tance in the acquisition of shares in the relevant com-
pany or its parent (item 6).
As one commentator noted at the time, the addition of
uncommercial transactions to s 588G significantly broad-
ened the ambit of a director’s statutory duty to prevent
insolvent trading.2 On its face, s 588G(1A) renders
directors personally liable for their failure to prevent
companies entering into uncommercial transactions within
the meaning of s 588FB of the Act. However, there is
little or no case law reflecting the application or use of
s 588G(1A) by liquidators, nor any substantive judicial
consideration of the provision and its remedial conse-
quences. It appears that s 588G(1A) has only received
what could best be described as “judicial mention” in a
few cases where the provision was not central to the
matters in issue (indeed, where no questions of insolvent
trading even arose).3
Legislative intent of s 588G(1A)
It appears that Parliament envisaged that s 588G(1A)
would enable the recovery by a liquidator of compen-
sation for loss or damage attributable to a s 588G(1A)
“debt” (eg, an uncommercial transaction) in the same
manner as any other ordinary debt. Paragraph 10 of the
relevant Explanatory Memorandum states that:4
The inclusion of uncommercial transactions in section
588G(1A) has implications for the protection of employee
entitlements, the prosecution of directors involved in “phoe-
nix” activity and recovery actions by liquidators for the
benefit of creditors generally. The amendment has general
application to all uncommercial transactions, and is not
restricted … (emphasis added).
In 2002, Morrison commented that:5
It seems fairly clear then, that the introduction of uncom-
mercial transactions to s 588G(1A) has the legislative intent
of making directors personally liable where they voluntar-
ily cause the company to make such transactions. Therefore
in addition to the operation of s 588FB uncommercial
transactions provision, directors now have a duty not to
engage in uncommercial transactions. Further it seems that
this will cover a variety of possible transgressions that go
beyond the purely financial payment of a debt.
Seeking compensation for a contravention
of s 588G in relation to a s 588G(1A) “debt”
While the purpose of the table of deemed incurred
debts in s 588G(1A) is clear, there is a significant
problem with the sub-section’s interaction with the
provisions of Subdiv A of Div 4 of Pt 5.7B of the Act
which lay down the proceedings which can be brought
against directors who have contravened the s 588G duty
to prevent insolvent trading. In terms of civil conse-
quences, if a director contravenes the duty to prevent
insolvent trading then that director is exposed to either:
• a proceeding brought by a liquidator under s 588M
of the Act for compensation (a creditor may also
bring such proceedings against the director under
s 588M with the consent of the liquidator: s 588R);
or
insolvency law bulletin September 2012 37
• an application by the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC) for a civil pen-
alty order under s 1317E and with it a pecuniary
penalty order or disqualification, in which case the
court is empowered under s 588J to also order that
the director pay compensation.
In both cases, the compensation which may be
ordered under ss 588M or 588J to be paid by the
transgressing director is equal to the loss or damage that
the relevant creditor has suffered in relation to the debt
which the director failed to prevent being incurred,
thereby constituting a contravention of s 588G. But just
who are the creditors for each of the deemed incurred
debts enumerated in s 588G(1A)? The failure of s 588G(1A)
to deem a respective creditor for each those deemed
debts means that ss 588M and 588J are arguably
ineffective in providing a compensatory remedy for a
director’s contravention (insofar as such contravention
entails a failure to prevent one of the s 588G(1A)
“debts” from being incurred).
To take the example of an uncommercial transaction
prior to the commencement of a liquidation, s 588G(1A)
will deem the transaction to be a debt incurred at the
time when the transaction was entered into. If a liqui-
dator then sought to bring an action to recover compen-
sation for and on behalf of the company (for the benefit
of its creditors) the liquidator will need to negotiate
(indeed, rely upon) the relevant terms of s 588M:
Section 588M: Recovery of compensation for loss result-
ing from insolvent trading
(1) This section applies where:
(a) a person (in this section called the director)
has contravened subsection 588G(2) or (3) in
relation to the incurring of a debt by a
company; and
(b) the person (in this section called the creditor)
to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or
damage in relation to the debt because of the
company’s insolvency; and
(c) the debt was wholly or partly unsecured when
the loss or damage was suffered; and
(d) the company is being wound up;
whether or not:
(e) the director has been convicted of an offence
in relation to the contravention; or
(f) a civil penalty order has been made against
the director in relation to the contravention.
(2) The company’s liquidator may recover from the
director, as a debt due to the company, an amount
equal to the amount of the loss or damage.
(emphasis added)
In the case of an uncommercial transaction (indeed
for all s 588G(1A) “debts”) it can be seen that it is
difficult to specify the identity of the relevant creditor for
the purposes of s 588M(1)(b). Similarly, for the purposes
of ss 588M(1)(b) and 588M(2), it would be difficult to
specify with any precision the loss or damage suffered
by an unspecified (indeed non-existent) creditor.
It is settled law that in the event of upholding a
contravention of s 588G, the court will examine and
determine the loss and damage suffered by the specific
creditors whose debts have comprised the contravention.
The matters set out in ss 588M(1)(a), (b) and (c) are
“prerequisites” to a compensation order.6 This may even
involve deducting from the incurred debts any dividends
received by the respective creditors for their provable
claims.7 This loss and damage — sustained by discrete
creditors in relation to their discrete debts — will
constitute the compensation payable under either s 588M
(liquidator action) or 588J (ASIC action). Given this
creditor-specific method of assessment, it is somewhat
curious that such compensation is recovered by a liqui-
dator as a debt due to the company, usually for the
benefit of all unsecured creditors in the winding up
generally.8
If s 588G(1A) were somehow construed to facilitate
recovery actions by liquidators for compensation for the
benefit of creditors, presumably it would be on the basis
that it is creditors as a whole who suffer loss or damage
as a result of, say, an uncommercial transaction (eg,
where the company has divested itself of property on
uncommercial terms such as inadequate consideration).
Insofar as s 588G(1A) deems an uncommercial transac-
tion to be a debt incurred, it might be faintly arguable
that ss 588M and 588J should be read in this manner
(though for the reasons discussed above this would
appear to be something of a stretch).
The statute is also silent as to the manner of assessing
such compensation. Is it appropriate to conduct the sort
of exercise undertaken by a court in fashioning a
s 588FF order to remedy a s 588FB uncommercial
transaction — ie, to arrive at an amount which repre-
sents the immediate “net benefit” provided by the
company under the transaction — or is some broader
assessment of loss and damage called for? Under s 588FF
(described by one judge as a “remedial smorgasbord”),9
a court may require a person to pay to the company an
amount “that in the court’s opinion, fairly represents
some or all of the benefits that the person has received
because of the transaction”.10 Is this the amount which a
director should be ordered to pay under s 588M for a
contravention of s 588G in respect of a s 588G(1A)
deemed debt, or should such a compensation order be
limited to the loss caused to the relevant creditors under
s 588M(1)(b) by reason of the transaction? The two
approaches may not always yield the same quantum.11
The silence and inadequacies of the statute on these
issues present real problems for a liquidator seeking to
obtain compensation from a director for an insolvent
trading contravention relating to a debt deemed to have
been incurred under s 588G(1A).
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On the other hand, if ASIC (rather than a liquidator)
applies for a civil penalty order, then s 1317H provides
that a court may order the director to compensate the
corporation for damage suffered by the corporation as a
result of the relevant contravention. For debts incurred
in contravention of s 588G which are not within the
categories of deemed debts in s 588G(1A), this section
would be unnecessary to invoke in light of ss 588J
(referred to above). However, if it is a s 588G(1A)
“debt” which is the subject of a director’s contravention,
s 588J will bear the same difficulties as s 588M
(discussed above). In this circumstance, s 1317H may
assist ASIC in a manner not available to a liquidator
proceeding under s 588M. A contravention of s 588G for
a debt incurred under s 588G(1A) would be a case of a
s 588G contravention resulting in a loss to the corpora-
tion (as opposed to a creditor) and s 1317H will be
available to ASIC.
Why an ineffectual s 588G(1A) denies
liquidators what would otherwise be a
preferable option to pursue directors for
uncommercial transactions
Does it really matter if s 588G(1A) has these prob-
lems? In the event of an antecedent uncommercial
transaction, a liquidator may also have recourse to a
general law action for breach of a director’s duty to act
in good faith and in the interests of the company, or for
a breach of the equivalent statutory duty under s 181 of
the Act. However, s 588G could provide better prospects
to a liquidator to seek redress for an uncommercial
transaction if the associated compensation (remedial)
provisions do in fact work. The effectiveness of s 588G(1A)
therefore matters, because s 588G could reach to instances
which will not always be actionable as a breach of a
director’s fiduciary or other statutory duties. Indeed, this
was presumably part of the reasoning behind Parliament
seeking to broaden the provision by deeming a variety of
incurred debts in s 588G(1A).
A director’s duty under s 588G extends responsibility
for inaction and is therefore a more stringent or onerous
duty than that owed by a director at general law or under
s 181. The s 588G duty is breached by a director failing
to prevent the company entering into the uncommercial
transaction. On the other hand, a breach of s 181 of the
Act (or the general law) would appear to require some
level of involvement on the part of the director in the
company’s decision to enter into the transaction or its
implementation. There is authority for the proposition
that s 181 is only contravened where there is deliberate
engagement in conduct with knowledge that it is not in
the company’s interest.12 In many cases an uncommer-
cial transaction may entail a clear contravention of both
duties. However, in some circumstances a director could
successfully defend an alleged breach of his/her s181
duty but be still vulnerable (under s 588G) to an alleged
failure to prevent the uncommercial transaction having
been entered into at a time when the company was
insolvent. There may also be circumstances (though
probably rare) where a transaction may be characterised
as uncommercial for the purposes of s 588FB, but not
sufficiently devoid of corporate benefit to constitute a
breach of s 181. In Tosich Constructions Pty Ltd
v Tosich,13 Lehane J stated (in obiter) that it may not
stand as a truism to say that a transaction for value can
never be an uncommercial transaction within the mean-
ing of s 588FB.14
Further, it stands to reason that a director of an
insolvent company will carry a heavier burden in mak-
ing out a “reasonable grounds” (to suspect solvency)
defence under s 588H(2) than will a counterparty to an
uncommercial transaction seeking to mount a “no rea-
sonable grounds to suspect insolvency” defence under
s 588FG(2). (Section 588FG(2) comes into play if a
liquidator sues under ss 588FE and 588FF of the Act.) It
stands to reason that a counterparty to an uncommercial
transaction may be less “infected” with knowledge or
grounds for suspicion of the company’s circumstances
when compared with the corporate knowledge of the
subject company’s director. While the beneficiary of an
uncommercial transaction may in any event struggle to
show valuable consideration (another necessary element
of the s 588FG(2) defence), it could argue a change of
position in support of the defence.
This analysis of Parliament’s original rationale for
adding uncommercial transactions to the table of deemed
incurred debts in s 588G(1A) is reinforced by the
Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Law
Amendment (Employee Entitlements) Act 2000 (Cth).
Paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Explanatory Memorandum
noted the recourse of liquidators to the ordinary uncom-
mercial transaction provisions in Pt 5.7B of the Act and
that:
... such claims by liquidators [against persons who receive
the benefit of the uncommercial transaction] are subject to
a number of defences; for example, where a person entered
into the transaction in good faith and had reasonable
grounds to expect that the company was solvent.15
The Explanatory Memorandum also noted that there
was:
... no duty on directors not to engage in a non-debt
uncommercial transaction where the company is or becomes
insolvent, and no penalty for doing so...
and that this would be addressed by:
... deeming that a company incurs a debt when it enters into
an uncommercial transaction (as defined under the voidable
transaction provisions) for the purposes of the insolvent
trading provisions.16
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By failing to address the inadequacies of the remedial
provision for liquidators, the 2000 amendments may not
have strengthened the insolvent trading laws in the
far-reaching manner Parliament apparently intended.
Conclusion
If the relevant statutory framework does enable a
liquidator to seek compensation from a director under
s 588M for an uncommercial transaction of an insolvent
company, the director may often be the preferred target
of a liquidator’s claim rather than the counterparty
actually advantaged by the transaction. That is to say,
liquidator action under s 588M could be preferable to
the customary s 588FF proceeding. However, it is
doubtful whether ss 588G(1A) and 588M can effectively
operate together in this manner. The best that can be said
for the compensatory consequences of s 588G(1A)
“deemed debts” is that if ASIC initiates proceedings
against a director for insolvent trading (a rare event) then
there will be a compensatory remedy for the company’s
loss in the form of s 1317H of the Act.
Given the apparent objectives of the legislature in
introducing and extending s 588G(1A) to broaden the
consequences for directors who are responsible for
insolvent trading, some statutory refinement is required
to ensure that the provision achieves its intended effect.
Section 588G(1A) could be amended to deem a compa-
ny’s creditors as a whole to be “the creditor” for the
purposes of s 588M(1)(b). Alternatively, a remedial
provision along the lines of s 1317H could be introduced
to enable a liquidator to recover compensation from a
director for loss or damage suffered by the company by
reason of the incurring of s 588G(1A) “debts”.
If liquidators are unable to wield a right of action
with a plain and uncontroversial compensatory remedy,
s 588G(1A) may continue to remain little more than
ineffectual window-dressing for Australia’s insolvent
trading laws. That said, in light of the ongoing debate
about these laws — already viewed by some as too strict
— it may be that a good number of stakeholders will be
content to let sleeping dogs lie.
Mark Wellard,
Lecturer, School of Law,
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